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Evidence from a Common-Pool Resource Experiment 









We present econometric evidence on the influence of an individual’s sociodemographic 
characteristics, economic background, and dynamic personal and group interactions on co-
operative behaviour in a social dilemma situation. The data are from a framed common-pool 
resource experiment conducted in Namibian and South African farming communities. Our 
paper helps to better understand the discrepancy between the fact that people seem to care 
about advancing their relative position in real life but tend to act to reduce inequality in a 
laboratory setting. We analyse the first move in the game, the cumulated amount of resources 
gained by the players and, by taking into account the temporal dimension of the game in a 
panel context, each individual move. 
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I. Introduction 
In a rational choice framework, social dilemma situations lead each person to pursue a 
strategy oriented at his or her short-term individual profit. However, if all individuals pursue 
the selfish strategy, the long-term interest of the group or the society may be damaged. Hence, 
everyone would be better off by co-operating. Repeated social dilemmas, such as contributing 
to public goods or extracting from collectively owned resources, are important obstacles in 
the development of a society. 
How people typically behave in trying to solve these dilemmas is investigated in a variety of 
field and experimental studies. Sociodemographic characteristics, institutional elements (e.g., 
sanctions and rewards), motivational influences (e.g., communication and group identity), and 
strategic elements (e.g., reciprocity conditional on what others do) seem to be essential 
ingredients for solving a social dilemma. Cognitive biases also influence behaviour in these 
situations. For instance, a person’s reported level of happiness depends on how his or her 
income compares to others in the same reference group (Easterlin, 1995). The importance of 
such positional concerns is illustrated by the expression ‘keeping up with the Joneses’, which 
Duesenberry (1948) states as the relative income hypothesis. Also, research on loss aversion 
by Tversky and Kahneman (1991) predicts that earnings below a certain reference point have 
higher marginal utility than earnings above the reference point. Thus, people who earn less 
compared to their reference group exert more effort. 
However, people often do not behave as theory would predict. First, in most economic 
experiments, when people can compare their experimental gains with those of others, they 
frequently are less concerned with boosting their own relative position, and are more 
concerned about increasing social welfare (Charness and Grosskopf, 2001; Charness and 
Rabin, 2002) or reducing relative payoffs due to inequity aversion (Bolton and Ockenfels, 
2000; Fehr and Schmidt, 1999).
1 Second, when preferences are reference dependent, i.e., 
individual utility depends on gains and losses relative to a status quo and not on final wealth 
                                                 
1 There is supporting experimental evidence of a preference for higher relative earnings in ultimatum games 
(Kirchsteiger, 1994) or common-pool resource experiments (Casari and Plott, 2003); however, rejection in 
ultimatum games or punishment in common-pool experiments could also be explained by theories of inequity 
aversion. In addition to theoretical models of social preferences where an individual’s utility increases with 
group equity (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999), including reciprocal behaviour (Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000) or altruism 
(Andreoni and Miller, 2002), which predicts many bargaining, market, and social dilemma games, other authors 
distinguish individual player types as being purely selfish, conditional co-operative, altruist, or confused 
(Fischbacher et al., 2001; Brosig, 2002; Kurzban and Houser, 2005; Bardsley and Moffatt, 2007), or analyse 
intentions or learning behaviour during the experiment (Mookerherjee and Sopher, 1994; Fudenberg and Levine, 
1998; Camerer and Ho, 1999). Recent research shows that players might be very competitive in one situation and 
co-operative in another and that so-called player types (selfish vs. co-operative) or social preferences are likely 
to shift over time and context (Herrmann and Orzen, 2008). This might partly explain the discrepancy between 
people’s attempts to reduce inequality in the laboratory and their interest in advancing their relative position in 
competitive environments or real-life situations.   3
positions, it is not always entirely clear which reference point is being used. In our framed 
field experiment, it is important to find out whether the reference point individuals use is 
experimental income, cumulated experimental income, absolute or relative experimental 
income, real-life income or wealth, or possibly even societal norms or expectations. 
In this paper, we address the question of how relative and absolute economic differences in 
the real world, as well as relative and absolute experimental payoff in a group of players, 
affect co-operation within the framework of a repeated social dilemma experiment. The data 
used come from a common-pool resource experiment conducted in Namibia and South Africa. 
Whether people try to increase their relative position in the group is an issue with far-reaching 
implications for the management of real-world commons. In our study region, such behaviour 
could result in a vicious circle: overuse of the land, leading to degradation and increasing 
poverty for the lowest income groups in rural areas, which will again exacerbate overgrazing. 
Solving the social dilemma could safeguard the livelihood of rural populations in many 
developing countries. Land-reform processes that offer access to private land and incentives 
to leave the commons will reduce resource pressure only temporarily; stable institutional 
arrangements that account for individual motivation and different degrees of co-operation 
across social groups are needed to achieve equilibrium in the longer run. If the relative 
income hypothesis holds and villagers are trapped in a vicious circle of competition for the 
commons (i.e., trying to keep more animals than the other villagers), only a rule backed by 
sanctions ensuring an appropriately low and equal number of animals on the village commons 
could solve the dilemma. Such a rule could either be provided formally by a governmental 
authority or informally through social agreement within the village community. 
In the following, we discuss our empirical methodology and how it relates to the relevant 
literature. Section III presents the a priori economic hypotheses that will be tested within our 
setup. The first round of choices is studied in Section IV and, with the help of cross-sectional 
analyses, the cumulated amount of extracted resources in Section V. Section VI presents a 
dynamic panel data model that helps explain the players’ choices in each round. In the last 
section, we summarise the findings and derive the main conclusions. 
 
II. Related Literature, Empirical Methodology, and Experimental Design 
Communal farmers and nonfarmers from rural villages in South Africa and Namibia 
participated in our common-pool resource experiment. These people use the commons for 
subsistence-level sheep and goat farming. The experimental task is framed as a decision on 
the number of animals individuals want to possess on a jointly-owned grazing land. In a   4
similar experiment, Cardenas (2003) shows that actual individual wealth and the 
heterogeneity of the group with regard to wealth are important factors in explaining the 
variation between groups and individuals. In his study, poorer people appear to be more co-
operative and he argues that less-wealthy farmers are more dependent on the commons and 
thus better able to sustain co-operative outcomes. However, Cardenas (2003) uses a 
subsample of the last three out of twenty rounds in the game that is, the face-to-face 
communication treatment only. He neither takes the different treatments nor the dynamics of 
the complete game into account, and his explanations might be misleading.
2 
Burns and Visser (2007) use different initial experimental endowment as a measure of wealth 
and Buckley and Croson (2006) employ different levels of per-round earnings to create 
heterogeneity among individuals. Based on the altruism and inequity aversion literature, 
Buckley and Croson (2006) expect that people with lower experimental earnings and 
cumulated earnings below the group median will contribute less to the public good. However, 
they discover that people with lower earnings and lower wealth contribute the same absolute 
amount to the public good as everyone else and that models of inequity aversion and altruism 
do not predict the behaviour of the better-off subjects. Indeed, given the difference in initial 
wealth, the less wealthy contribute relatively more. 
The framed field experiment undertaken by Burns and Visser (2007) in South African fishing 
communities also reveals that people with lower experimental endowment provide the same 
absolute, but relatively higher, amount of the public good. Thus, larger experimental income 
and wealth reduces an individual’s willingness to co-operate or, alternatively, less income and 
wealth leads to an increased willingness to co-operate. However, these effects might be due to 
a demonstration effect or an overjustification of the less wealthy players that would not occur 
in real-world interactions. In contrast to these studies, we interpret cumulated experimental 
earnings as wealth and lagged earnings as income and derive absolute and relative measures 
for both variables over time. 
We address the question of how sociodemographic and economic differences across 
individuals, and dynamic interactions within a group, affect co-operation within the 
framework of a repeated social dilemma with a nonstandardized and experienced subject pool 
in a framed field experiment. In our analysis, we follow a suggestion by Cardenas and Ostrom 
(2004) and take into account different layers of information the participants might use in 
making their decisions. 
                                                 
2 Similar approaches to studying sociodemographic influences on behaviour are applied to the analyses of one-
shot field experiments on trust, fairness, or risk (for a review of experiments in developing countries, see 
Cardenas and Carpenter, 2006). Some results of these studies are discussed in Section 3.   5
We start the analysis by investigating the determinants of a player’s first move in the game, 
which we believe will be influenced solely by sociodemographic background, how the player 
sees the other four members in the group, and the experimental task. 
Second, we analyse the average appropriation level in the game and test for the influence of 
sociodemographic and group variables. Differences between significant explanatory variables 
in the models explaining first choice and average choice of players can be attributed to game-
related effects, particularly context-oriented learning. Since we control for being a farmer as 
well as for income and wealth, we can test whether the wealth effect is related to experience 
in using the commons, as argued in Cardenas (2003), or whether it is inherent to a person’s 
wealth and/or income.
3 
Third, we study the game dynamics, which allows an analysis of how the subject’s behaviour 
changes over (game) time due to group interaction and the impact of treatment effects, as well 
as the payoffs received. As individual payoffs and group extraction from the resource are the 
main pieces of information people receive in the course of the game, we think that 
participants use this information to update their beliefs about other players’ earnings and to 
decide on their own strategies. We therefore study the influence of the choices of our 
probands and systematically relate them to the public signals they obtain and process.
4 
In our empirical models, we rely on cross-section, as well as panel, regressions that control 
for heterogeneity within and across time using fixed effects when taking into account dynamic 
game interactions (see Wilcox, 2006). To increase estimation efficiency, we use a consistent 
general-to-specific modelling approach (see Hendry, 1993) that avoids any path dependencies 
in the elimination process of insignificant variables. 
We model grazing land as a common-pool resource (CPR) that is extensively used for grazing 
small ruminants. The defining features of a CPR are subtractability of the resource and 
nonexcludability of other users, both of which generate negative externalities that constitute a 
need for co-ordination and co-operation. The experiment is based on the standard problem of 
individual harvests from a common pool resource by N = 5 identical individuals. The model is 
                                                 
3 In our study, wealth is related to experience in using the commons (as wealth is largely measured by number of 
livestock). Following Cardenas (2003), we would expect that wealthier people and farmers play more co-
operatively and we can control for both influences. 
4 See Houser et al. (2004) or Coats and Neilson (2005) for laboratory experiments that elicit beliefs from actual 
choices without inferring theoretical assumptions or direct questions. For instance, Croson (2007) discovers that 
voluntary individual contributions to a public good are related to reciprocity (i.e., the contributions of others or 
to their beliefs about those contributions) and not to commitment or altruism. In the only framed field 
experiment, Velez et al. (2005) measure beliefs by a direct elicitation of responses and find that model of 
conformism, in which it is not the actual choices but the average expected choices of others that best describe 
own strategies. They conclude that models of altruism, reciprocity, or inequity aversion do not describe their 
data. Unfortunately, Velez et al. (2005) do not report actual per capita income and wealth of the participants in 
their field experiments.   6
similar to those of Ostrom et al. (1994), Falk et al. (2002), and Casari and Plott (2003). An 
individual i decides how many sheep  {} 9 .. 1 ∈ i x  he wants to own and the number of 







j i x x . He has an endowment ei, faces 
constant prices p, and is confronted with a concave payoff function (Equation (1)) with 
decreasing returns to scale (see Velez et al., 2005). 
) ( ) ( i i i i i i i i x x dx x x c px e − − + − + − + = π ,           ( 1 )  
where ) ( i i i x x dx − +  captures the social dilemma. The Nash equilibrium (NE) of the game can 
be derived using the first-order conditions obtained from maximising earnings by varying the 
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As all agents have identical incentives and preferences, the Nash equilibrium is unique and 





















.      ( 3 )  
The Nash equilibrium results in an inefficiently high level of use. The social optimum (SO) 
results from maximising group revenue ∂Пi/∂xi. The group profit function (Equation (4)) is 
nonlinear in the group total number of sheep as it first increases in X and then decreases. 
2
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.         ( 5 )  
For N = 5, e = 900, p = 116.875, c = 17.875, and d = 2.75, the social optimum is  i i x x ∀ = 2 
and the Nash equilibrium is  i i x x ∀ = 7 . These numbers were chosen s o  a s  t o  a r r i v e  a t  a  
realistic number of sheep for the experiment. The admissible range for choices is {1,..,9}, 
representing {1-10,..,91-100} sheep on an area of 1000ha. If 5 players graze up to 20 sheep, 
the optimal carrying capacity of the commons is 100 sheep. 
Forty-two groups consisting of randomly-selected participants from South African and 
Namibian villages play a first stage with 10 rounds of a typical common-pool resource game 
based on the model presented above. After the 10
th round, a “community election” is held and   7
a new institution, based on the majority of votes, is implemented during Rounds 11–20.
5 The 
new institutions that can be voted on are: 
•  External regulation with imperfectly monitored and gradually increasing penalty. 
•  External regulation with randomised reward. 
•  Face-to-face communication. 
We employ the experimental protocol suggested by Cardenas et al. (2000) and presented in 
more detail by Vollan (2008a, 2008b). Table A1 in the Appendix provides descriptive 
statistics of participant characteristics. A total of 210 probands participated in 42 sessions of 
20 rounds each, resulting in 4200 observations for the panel analysis. It is a diverse sample: 
players’ education ranges from 0 to 16 years, their age from 18 to 89, and their total annual 
income—including remittances and part-time work—from 0 to 504,000 South African rand.
6 
 
III. Theoretical Hypotheses 
We conduct our empirical analysis along several dimensions. The first dimension is related to 
the variables of interest. Our dependent variables include: (i) the number of sheep chosen in 
the first period, (ii) the cumulative number of sheep in the whole game, and (iii) the number 
of sheep in each period. The second dimension has to do with the explanatory variables. In the 
analysis of (i) and (ii), we use sociodemographic variables as covariates, while (iii) allows 
using game-specific variables as regressors. The third dimension reflects different estimation 
procedures. Here, we make use of cross-sectional ordinary least squares estimates (OLS) for 
the first two dependent variables, and panel data methods for explaining the choice in each 
round of the game. We also analyse the impact of the treatments introduced after Round 10. 
Below, we discuss our theoretical priors with respect to the variables listed. 
Age: Sutter and Kocher (2007) provide evidence that trust in anonymous partners increases 
almost linearly from early childhood to early adulthood but stays constant afterward. List 
(2004) finds, in three different field experiments related to public goods, that the younger and 
middle-aged cohort behave the same as they have been shown to do in laboratory experiments 
but that the older cohort (age > 49) co-operates at a higher rate than would be expected from 
laboratory experiments. Thus, we expect a (nonlinear) effect of age, with older participants 
showing a higher degree of co-operation. 
                                                 
5 In the situation where two players voted for institution x, two players for institution y, and one player for 
institution z, the choice between institution x and y was based on chance. 
6 The exchange rate of the rand with the US dollar was 6.38 rand/dollar at the time of the experiment (1 March 
2006). One South African rand is equal to one Namibian dollar. The South African rand is an authorised means 
of payment in Namibia.    8
Gender:  Croson and Buchan (1999) and Croson and Gneezy (2009) find no substantial 
differences between men and women playing the trust game. Schwieren and Sutter (2008) 
discover a weak gender effect for trust in ability but no gender effect for trust in co-operation. 
Other experimental studies show women to behave less selfishly than men (Eckel and 
Grossman, 1996) and they appear to be less competitive than men (Gneezy et al., 2003). 
Female probands exhibit less trust (but more reciprocity) (e.g., Greig and Bohnet, 2008; Barr, 
2003).  
Thus, although the precise relation between gender and pro-social preferences remains 
unclear, we in general expect more co-operation from female participants. 
Marital status: Our  a priori hypothesis is that due to their greater economic capacity, 
married people will choose fewer sheep as they are not as dependent on additional life-
preserving earnings as are widowed or divorced people, who form the reference category. 
Similarly, single persons will choose fewer sheep, but we would expect the difference to be 
smaller.  
Household: Our prior is that since the head of the household is responsible for the well-being 
of all household members, often under adverse conditions, he is more used to thinking in 
terms of ensuring the survival of the group. Larger households need more resources and 
perhaps are also more familiar with the concept of competing for resources; thus members of 
large households may choose a large number of sheep. A similar argument holds in the case 
of the number of children; a household with children will need more resources since children 
cannot contribute to the survival of the household as much as adults.  
Education: In our sample, education is measured as the number of years of schooling. A 
priori, we expect that those who are better educated have a better understanding of 
overgrazing or co-operation problems. However, the better educated may also be more 
cognisant of the advantages to be gained from exploiting the group. 
Local attachment: In our experiment, all players in group are from the same village, and we 
thus proxy local attachment by the number of years a person has lived in the village. Our 
expectation is that those with a greater degree of community spirit (i.e., longer local 
attachment) will play more co-operatively. 
Religion: Respondents who are members of a religion that emphasises the equality of human 
beings and the duty to help neighbours should play more co-operatively. For instance, 
Christian beliefs put a strong focus on sharing resources, with Protestant faiths (Methodist,   9
Lutheran, Dutch Reformed (NGK/VGK), and Anglicans) being particularly critical of 
amassing wealth.
7 
Church attendance: Owen and Videras (2007) report that religious beliefs and church 
membership affect the voluntary provision of environmental public goods. We use the number 
of church visits per month as a proxy for a person’s religiosity. More religious persons may be 
willing to give up resources and act more co-operatively. 
Occupation:  We conjecture that the unemployed and pensioners have a greater need for 
resources as they are less able to fend for themselves. We thus expect the permanently 
employed to choose fewer sheep. Also, experienced farmers should understand the problem of 
overgrazing and thus may play relatively more co-operatively. 
Economic situation: We expect that high-income participants have less need for additional 
resources. In a public good game, Burns and Visser (2007) find that people with higher per 
capita income behave more co-operatively. Johansson-Stenman et al. (2006) and Greig and 
Bohnet (2008) find positive correlations between income, trust, and reciprocity; Cardenas 
(2003) reports negative ones for absolute wealth and heterogeneity of wealth. However, a 
high income may also reflect a greater preference for consumption than for leisure, which 
would suggest choosing a larger number of sheep.
8 When looking at the relative income 
position in terms of income quartiles, there is an incentive to choose more sheep to defend or 
advance one’s position. Similar arguments apply to absolute and relative wealth, too. Thus, 
we expect the absolute income effect to have a positive influence and the relative income 
effect to have a negative influence on co-operation.  
Collective action: Membership in the Community Committee
9 may be indicative of active 
participation in the provision of collective goods, which should imply choosing fewer sheep. 
The social capital literature argues (Glaeser et al., 2000) that membership in organisations 
leads to more co-operative behaviour. However, given that work is sometimes distributed via 
Committee membership, such membership could also indicate a stronger income orientation. 
This is another situation where the results of experiments have been ambiguous. For example, 
in a public good experiment comparing kibbutz members to city residents in Israel, Ruffle and 
Sosis (2006) find that kibbutz members do not play more co-operatively when paired with 
non kibbutz members. Perhaps it is that the co-operative enhancing effect of membership and 
                                                 
7 In South Africa, Christianity is the major religion, albeit in many different forms. Roman Catholic, Methodist, 
Dutch Reformed, and Anglican are most prevalent in our study region. Due to its German colonial history, 
Namibia is the only country outside Europe with a Lutheran majority. 
8 This assumes that the income level is above the minimum needed to ensure the person’s basic physical 
survival. 
9 Community Committees are supposed to make decisions on different areas of public life in the village.   10
collective action only works for in-group encounters. To what extent village residence can be 
understood as a proxy for group membership is not clear and to shed a little light on this 
uncertainty, we will employ a second collective action proxy, namely, days of unpaid 
collective work. 
Regional differences: A dummy variable for Namibia is included as a control for regional 
differences.
10 
Payoff of player in t-1: In traditional microeconomic models, agents are interested only in 
their own situation and the relevant variables enter the utility function in absolute values. If 
this model of behaviour is correct, we expect that a player’s individual winnings will strongly 
affect the player’s choices. 
Cumulated payoffs of player in t-1: This is a variant of the previous argument, now 
focussing on winnings over a period of time instead of at just one point in time. This could be 
interpreted as a sort of trend effect in contrast to the short-term impact captured by the 
previous variable. It may also reflect a slow adjustment effect. 
Payoffs of group in t-1: A negative correlation of group play and individual choice in round t 
suggests reciprocity (i.e., when the group has performed well, an individual member of it will 
reduce the number of his or her sheep further; when the group has performed badly, the 
member will increase his or her own payoff to punish the others). Note that the value for the 
group is computed without the payoff to the respective individual. 
Cumulated payoffs of group in t-1: This variable takes into account a delayed effect over a 
period of time and can indicate a trend or a slow adjustment process. 
Relative payoff of player in round t-1: Based on Buckley and Croson (2006) and models of 
inequality aversion and altruism, we hypothesise that people with higher accumulated payoffs 
will play more co-operatively. Thus, a negative correlation between (relative) payoff in the 
previous round and appropriation choice in the current round suggests immediate effects of 
inequality aversion or altruism as people change their strategies. High (low) payoffs are 
followed by low (high) appropriations levels. A positive correlation indicates that players are 
reinforcing their strategies and playing competitively. High payoffs lead to high appropriation 
(low co-operation) and low payoffs to low appropriation (more co-operations). These effects 
become clearer when measured in relative terms. 
Cumulated relative payoffs of player in t-1: Here, the same correlation is true as above, but 
the effect of inequality aversion and reciprocity only becomes apparent after the passage of 
                                                 
10 A significant country effect for certain treatments in the data set was reported by Vollan (2008b).   11
time. Moreover, a negative correlation with cumulated relative payoffs suggests a certain 
threshold level of guilt that occurs when a person exploits the group for too long. 
 
IV. Explaining the First Move in the Game by Sociodemographic Variables 
In a one-shot game, by definition, game-related aspects cannot explain a player’s first move. 
However, the move may be influenced by the player’s sociodemographic characteristics. 
Given that group memberships are allocated randomly, one might expect group effects to be 
irrelevant. However, in this particular experiment, most people know each other as they are 
from the same village. Thus, they hold views about the other group members that may very 
well affect their first move. Second, there is some, if rather limited, group interaction before 
the game begins, which may give rise to first impressions about the other group members. 
Thus, we include group dummies and then statistically test to see whether or not they matter. 
The estimation method is ordinary least squares and the diagnostic tests of the residuals of 
Model 1, the general model, show no violation of standard assumptions (see Table 1).  
It is apparent from Model 1 that most variables are insignificant when judged by their t-tests. 
To reduce the number of variables in the model, we apply general-to-specific modelling (see 
Hendry, 1993).
11 Before applying a consistent testing-down procedure at a 5% nominal 
significance level, we ensure that our general model is a congruent representation of the data, 
i.e., that none of the diagnostic tests indicates a problem. Given the relatively small number of 
observations, we allow the inclusion of the group dummies in the model-reduction process.  
 
Table 1: Explaining the number of sheep played in the first round  




Variables  Coefficients SE Coefficients SE 
Age      
 Age  0.13  0.080    
 Age  squared  -0.001  0.0009     
Gender      
 Male  -0.59  0.498     
                                                 
11 We use the Gets algorithm (Hendry and Krolzig, 1999), which improves on the automatic general-to-specific 
modelling procedure of Hoover and Perez (1999). These procedures avoid problems associated with possible 
path dependencies in the reduction process by checking each possible reduction path and ensuring that none of 
the diagnostic statistics are violated.   12
 
Marital status      
 Married  0.24  1.026     
 Single  0.70  1.087     
Household      
  Head of household  0.29  0.607     
 Household  size  0.10  0.094     
  Number of children   0.01  0.149     
Education      
  No. of years  -0.03  0.095     
Local attachment      
  Years living in village  -0.02  0.017     
Religion      
 Lutheran  -1.38  0.997    
 NGK/VGK    -0.76  1.291    
 Catholic  -0.98  0.723    
 Others  1.13  0.915  1.25(*) 0.657 
Church attendance       
  Number of church visits per 
 months  0.14  0.198    
Occupation      
  Unemployed  4.02  2.769 5.39** 0.317 
 Pensioner  0.78  1.374     
 Permanently  employed  0.90  0.985     
 Farmer  0.87  0.686     
Economic situation      
  Absolute individual income  -0.000001  0.000007     
  Lower-middle  quartile  3.91  2.822 5.18** 0.309 
 Upper-middle  quartile  4.75(*) 2.783 6.45** 0.321 
 Highest  quartile  3.57  2.912 5.77** 0.305 
  Absolute HH wealth  -0.000004  0.000007     
 Lower-middle  quartile  0.52  0.693     
 Upper-middle  quartile  -0.25 0.633     
 Highest  quartile  0.45 0.906       13
Collective action      
 Committee  member  -0.14  0.507     
 Days of unpaid collective 
 work  0.01  0.007     
Controls      
 Namibia  -1.51  2.73     
 Constant  -0.23  4.11     
  Group dummies  40 groups    5 groups 
No. of observations  192    192 
SE of regression  2.24    2.09 
R
2  0.37  0.18 
Adj. R
2  0.01  0.14   
Joint test of all variables  F(70,121) = 1.02  F(10,182) =  138.6** 
Heteroscedasticity test  F(79,41) = 0.30  F(10,171) =  1.03 
Normality test  Chi
2(2) = 0.09  Chi
2(2) =  1.52 
RESET test  F(1,120) = 0.41  F(1,181) =  0.001 
Testing exclusion restriction F(61,121)  =  0.60 
Notes: 
i)  The estimator is OLS. 
ii)  The symbols **,*, and (*) indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 % level, respectively. 
iii) Reference categories of dummies that are not self-explanatory: Marital status: Widowed 
  and divorced; Occupation: Occasional work; Farmer: All other types of work; Religion: 
  Methodist; Income quartiles: lowest quartile; Wealth quartiles: lowest quartile. 
iv) Diagnostic statistics: Heteroscedasticity test: White (1980) test using squares of the 
  regressors; Normality test: Jarque and Bera (1987) test with a small-sample correction; 
  RESET test: Misspecification test developed by Ramsey (1969). 
v) The  R
2 in the reduced model is based on the squared correlation coefficient between 
  original and fitted series. 
 
Since none of the diagnostic tests (see bottom part of Table 2) is violated, Model 1 is a 
congruent representation of the data-generating process. Applying the reduction algorithm 
leads to the much smaller Model 2, which also passes all the statistical tests.  
First, there are five group dummies left in the equation, which are jointly significant at the 1% 
level (F(5,182) = 5.49**). This suggests that the participants either had preconceived ideas 
about the other group players based on previous acquaintances or that the short group 
interaction before the game was sufficient to influence the first move. These group effects are 
also economically relevant as the largest effect in absolute terms is due to one group that 
chose, in its first move, on average almost four sheep less than the others.   14
Being unemployed significantly influences the number of sheep chosen, which is in line with 
our theoretical prior. The economic relevance of this statistical effect is large, as we cannot 
reject the hypothesis that the unemployed chose five sheep more on average in their first 
move than the other participants (Chi
2(1) = 1.50).  
Those who do not adhere to any of the listed religions choose significantly more sheep than 
those having religious beliefs. The effects are economically relevant; we cannot statistically 
reject that these persons choose 1.5 sheep more than those with a stated religious belief 
(Chi
2(1) = 0.14).  
Finally, we observe statistically highly significant positive effects for the income quartiles. 
Those who are relatively better off choose a noticeably larger number of sheep in the first 
period compared to the lowest income group. However, there appears to be a nonlinear effect 
with regard to the relative income position in society. Those who are in the two highest 
income categories choose one sheep more than those who are in the lower-middle income 
quartile. The coefficients on the upper-middle and highest income category are statistically 
indistinguishable from 6, and the coefficient on the lower-middle income category is 5 
(Chi
2(4) = 2.99), which is in general accord with our theoretical prior of a defence of the 
relative income position in society. The larger point estimate of the coefficient on the upper-
middle income quartile could be interpreted as an expression of this group’s interest in 
moving into the highest income quartile; however, the main dividing line is between the 
poorest quartile and the three richer quartiles, the latter choosing noticeably more sheep than 
the former. 
 
V. Explaining the Cumulated Number of Sheep Chosen in the Game 
We now discuss and explain the cumulative number of sheep played in all 20 rounds of the 
game. Due to the aggregation across time, we can use only the sociodemographic variables. 
We again include group dummies to control for group-specific fixed effects. The outcome of 
the analysis is shown in Model 3 of Table 2. The diagnostic statistics of Model 3 in Table 3, 
the general model, are acceptable, i.e., the model is a congruent representation of the data-
generating process. A consistent testing-down process at a nominal significance level of 5% 
leads to the much simplified Model 4. 
We find that players who engage in unpaid community work and those who have higher 
income accumulate a relatively larger number of sheep over the course of the game (only 
significant at a 10% level).  
   15
Table 2: Explaining the cumulated number of sheep  




Variables  Coefficients SE Coefficients SE 
Age      
 Age  0.29  0.700     
 Age  squared  -0.006  0.007     
Gender      
 Male  -2.95  4.314     
Marital status      
 Married  -12.21  8.881     
 Single  -13.26  9.410     
Household      
  Head of household  -1.65  5.255    
 Household  size  1.12  0.813    
  Number of children   0.64  1.285    
Education      
  No. of years  0.32  0.822    
Local attachment      
  Years living in village  -0.21  0.149    
Religion      
 Lutheran  -11.90  8.635  -14.93**  5.236 
 NGK/VGK    9.71  11.18     
 Catholic  -0.59  6.257     
 Others  4.42  7.923     
Church attendance       
  Number of church visits   -0.89  1.712     
Occupation      
 Unemployed  -6.23  23.97     
 Pensioner  22.96(*)  11.90     
 Permanently  employed  14.17(*)  8.527     
 Farmer  3.78  5.942       16
 
Economic situation      
  Absolute individual income  0.0001*  0.00006  0.00007(*)  0.00004 
 Lower-middle  quartile  -10.02  24.44     
 Upper-middle  quartile  -15.33  24.10     
 Highest  quartile  -24.83  25.21     
  Absolute HH wealth  -0.000002  0.00006     
 Lower-middle  quartile  -2.52  6.001     
 Upper-middle  quartile  -1.08  5.479     
 Highest  quartile  -3.67  7.840     
Collective action      
 Committee  member  -1.026  4.390     
 Days of unpaid collective 
 work  0.08  0.058  0.10* 0.042 
Controls      
 Namibia  19.44  23.88    
 Constant  87.36*  36.10  97.19** 1.637 
  Group dummies  40 groups    7 groups   
No. of observations  192    192  
SE of regression  19.41    18.54  
R2 0.44    0.24  
Adj.  R2  0.12  0.19  
Joint-test all variables  F(70,121)  = 1.36(*) F(10,181)  = 5.60** 
Heteroscedasticity test  F(79,41) =  0.47  F(12,168) =  1.74(*) 
Heteroscedasticity test with 
cross-products n.a.    F(29,151)  =  1.12 
Normality test  Chi2(2) =  2.54  Chi2(2) =  3.51  
RESET test  F(1,120) =  0.11  F(1,180) =  0.13 
Testing exclusion restriction     F(60,121)  =  0.74 
Notes: See Table 1. 
 
Those belonging to the Lutheran faith choose relatively fewer sheep than those adhering to 
other faiths. The sign for the Lutheran faith indicator is in line with our theoretical prior, and   17
the positive effect of income supports the consumption-leisure trade-off argument rather than 
the basic needs hypothesis.  
In the case of voluntary work for the community, our expectations turn out to be wrong: those 
who volunteer more hours choose more sheep over the course of the game. There are several 
possible explanations for this unexpected finding. First, the variable may not really capture a 
person’s willingness to contribute to a collective good, that is, it could be that the person 
engages in volunteer work to feel good about himself or herself rather than to do good for the 
community. Second, it could be that volunteers look upon the unpaid work as “paying their 
dues” and hope to be rewarded for it by gaining a paid job from the community in the future. 
Thus, engaging in voluntary work could be an indicator of a person’s work ethic (Stiglitz, 
1988). Third, since there was no way of verifying the stated number of volunteer hours, the 
data could be faulty. 
An assessment of the quantitative impact of the remaining explanatory variables in Model 4 
reveals that the estimated economic effects are not particularly high. To raise the cumulated 
number of sheep by one, individual income must increase by more than 14,000 rand. 
Computing the corresponding elasticity reveals that a 1 percentage point rise in income leads 
to a 0.01 percentage increase in the number of sheep chosen over the whole game. Regarding 
the days of unpaid collective work, 10 more days of community-oriented work raises the 
number of sheep chosen by one. This implies an elasticity of 0.01, yet again a highly inelastic 
reaction. Finally, converting from Methodist faith to Lutheran will, ceteris paribus, reduce the 
number of accumulated sheep during the course of the game by five and a half, which is 
almost 6% of the average number of cumulated sheep. Thus, for the cumulative number of 
sheep, the only economically relevant case is the difference between Lutherans and other 
religious faiths, with the former choosing noticeable fewer sheep than the others. 
We also find that there are seven significant group effects in Model 4, the coefficients of 
which range from 22 to –26. Thus, group membership can have a substantial impact on the 
accumulated number of sheep chosen by an individual. As the allocation of players to specific 
groups was random, this suggests that social processes within groups may play an important 
role in explaining individual choice. Consequently, we analyse group-specific behaviour 
further in Section VI. 
It is also instructive to compare these results with those obtained from the regression on 
players’ first moves. Income has a similar positive effect on the number of sheep played, but 
it is relative income that influences the first move and absolute income that affects the 
cumulative number. Regarding the impact of religious beliefs, it is noteworthy that   18
respondents not affiliated with a major religion choose more sheep in the first move, while 
those of Lutheran faith select fewer sheep over the course of the game. The unemployed, who 
choose significantly more sheep in the first round, select an average number of sheep over the 
course of the full game, a behavioural change suggesting that social processes and learning 
effects lead to more pro-social behaviour and can be effective regulating devices in groups. 
Finally, it is interesting to look at the impact of the different treatments on the cumulated 
number of sheep. We cannot include the treatment effects in the previous model due to 
multicollinearity arising with the group dummies. Nevertheless, it is interesting to see the 
estimation results in a setting with treatments and excluding group dummies. The consistent 
testing-down process (exclusion test: F(30,159) = 1.02) leads to Equation (6): 
 
Cumulated no of sheep = 98** + 0.0001** individual income – 9.2** reward    (6) 
  No. of obs.: 192; SE of regression: 20; R
2 = 0.07; Adj. R
2 = 0.06; F(2,189) = 7.14 
Note: ** indicates significance at a 1% level. 
 
The diagnostic tests do not indicate any statistical problems and the results imply that those 
with higher personal income choose a relatively larger cumulative number of sheep. This is in 
line with the outcome of the model including group dummies instead of treatments. However, 
the only other significant variable is the dummy indicating the group choice of ‘reward’. 
Those groups that select ‘reward’ choose a much smaller number of sheep that is both 
statistically significant and economically relevant. 
However, comparing model selection criteria for the reduced group model with those for the 
treatment model leads to the conclusion that including group dummies is statistically 
preferable to considering treatment effects.
12 Hence, individual group effects dominate the 
impact of treatments with regard to explaining the cumulative number of sheep chosen. 
 
VI. Explaining the Number of Sheep Chosen in Each Round 
We now take a look at the number of sheep chosen in each round by each individual player, 
i.e., we make use of the time dimension in our data set. Since we now include group-related 
variables, we can model how group dynamics affect individual strategies over the course of 
the game. Technically, this means that we move toward a panel data analysis. If the 
individual-specific effects are random, it would be appropriate to apply an asymptotically 
                                                 
12 Model selection criteria: Akaike: 6.009 (treatment dummies), 5.896 (group dummies); Schwarz: AIC: 6.060 
(treatment dummies), 6.082 (group dummies); Hannan-Quinn: 6.030 (treatment dummies), 5.971 (group 
dummies); final prediction error: 407.1 (treatment dummies), 363.5 (group dummies).   19
efficient random effects model estimated via feasible generalised least squares. As it turns out, 
though, the individual dummies are highly significant, which implies that a GLS random 
effects model is not appropriate (Mundlak, 1978). Therefore, we employ a fixed effects 
estimator in the form of a least squares dummy variable model (LSDV), the results of which 
can be found in Table 3. As the sample is large (almost 4000 observations), making the 
statistical tests very sensitive to violations of the null hypotheses, we test at a 1% level 
following Leamer (1983), who recommends adjusting the significance level inversely with the 
sample size. 
 
Table 3: Explaining the number of sheep played in each round 




Variables  Coefficients SE Coefficients  SE 
Game-related variables: 
Individual      
  Payoff of player in t-1  0.006  0.004    
  Cumulated payoffs of 
 player  in  t-1  0.00001  0.0003    
Game-related variables: 
Group      
  Payoffs of group in t-1  -0.003**  0.001  -0.002** 0.0003 
  Cumulated payoffs of 
  group in t-1  0.0003** 0.0001 0.0003**  0.0001 
  Relative payoff of player 
 in  t-1  -3.22  4.74  3.42**  0.98 
 Cumulated  relative 
  payoffs of player in t-1  -14.46**  3.65  -14.09**  3.24 
Treatment variables       
 Penalty  -0.06  0.37     
 Reward  0.10  0.41     
Individual decision on 
treatments       
  Agree to treatment  -0.75  0.62     
  Agree to penalty rule  -0.55  0.54     
  Agree to reward rule  0.34  0.38       20
Controls       
 Constant  11.49**  1.47  9.71**  0.88 
  Individual dummies  209     209    
  Group dummies  41     41    
  Time dummies  18     18    
No. of observations  3990    3990 
SE of regression  2.252    2.254 
R
2  0.271  0.268 
Joint test: substantial 
variables 
Chi
2(11) =  99.7**  Chi
2(4) =  89.0** 
Joint test: time dummies  Chi
2(18) =  59.7**  Chi
2(18) =  135.4** 
Joint test: group dummies  Chi
2(41) =  2107**  Chi
2(41) =  1333** 
Joint test: individual 
dummies 
Chi
2(209) =  1353**  Chi
2(209) =  1465** 
Autocorrelation test: AR(1)  N(0,1) =  0.12  N(0,1) =  0.41 
Autocorrelation test: AR(4)  N(0,1) =  1.95  N(0,1) =  1.86 
Testing exclusion restriction  Chi
2(7) =  5.55 
Notes: 
i)  Least squares dummy variables estimator. Robust standard errors are based on Arellano 
 (1987). 
ii) **  indicates  significance at a 1% level. 
iii) Diagnostic statistics: Autocorrelation test: AR(n): n
th-order panel autocorrelation tests 
  distributed normally under the null. 
 
The large number of observations also allows for the application of heteroscedasticity-
consistent errors, based on Arellano (1987), which rely on asymptotic properties. Panel tests 
for autocorrelation indicate no significant degree of correlated residuals.
13 As controls, we 
include individual, group, and time (round-played) dummies. Given the large number of 
observations, we do not include the controls in the testing-down process. All three dummies 
are highly significant, as can be seen from the joint Chow-type tests. This underscores the 
finding from our previous sections, namely, that group effects play a role in the number of 
sheep chosen by the players. Since the sociodemographic information we analysed previously 
is time invariant, it cannot be included here due to the fixed effects. However, if we substitute 
                                                 
13 We also estimate a dynamic panel data model of the Arellano-Bond type that allows for an unbiased 
estimation of a lagged dependent variable. However, in our specification including game-related variables, as 
well as time, group, and individual dummies—and using instruments that satisfy the Sargan test—we do not find 
evidence of a significant lagged dependent variable (results available on request).   21
the individual dummies by these sociodemographic variables and keep the pooled data format, 
we find the following effects relative to the reference categories (see notes for Table 1). 
Married and single persons choose, on average, 0.40 to 0.35 sheep less (difference not 
significant), the head of household chooses about 0.25 fewer sheep, Lutherans select about 0.4 
sheep less, and with every 1000 units of income, 0.002 more sheep are chosen. The latter two 
effects were also seen in the analysis above. The values for family-related variables here 
suggest that widowed and divorced persons act more selfishly than others, as theorised. The 
problem of collective goods appears to be relatively more relevant for those who are 
household heads. Suggestive as these results are, note that the exclusion of individual-specific 
dummies will be rejected by the data. 
The estimates of the round-played dummies from Model 6 of Table 4 show a very interesting 
pattern when plotted against time as illustrated in Figure 1. 
 






5 10 15 20
Round-played panel data model  Round-played dummies-only model 
 
Notes: Left-axis: time dummies from fixed-effects model (Equation (6)); right-axis: time 
dummies from pure dummy variable model. 
 
Over the course of the game, there is an almost linear decline in the number of sheep chosen, 
as indicated by the trend line in Figure 1. This implies that with each round, the average 
number of sheep chosen declines by almost 0.5.
14 This result is noteworthy, as the literature 
(e.g., Fehr and Gächter, 2000) typically reports that co-operation rates decline as the 
experiment proceeds. Thus, our results suggest that the time pattern of co-operation identified 
in other experiments should not be treated as a fact; further research is needed. 
                                                 
14 The R
2 of a regression of round-played dummies from Model 6 on a deterministic linear trend is almost 0.98. 
The coefficient on the trend term is 0.48**.   22
Note that this particular time pattern is conditional on controlling for game-related variables. 
To illustrate this, Figure 1 also contains a line showing the estimated time dummies in a 
model that includes dummy variables only. The line fluctuates around a stationary value 
before the treatment in Round 10. The introduction of the treatments has a negative effect of 
about one and a half units on the chosen number of sheep. However, over time the importance 
of the treatment appears to decline and the number of sheep chosen rebounds. Given the 
information from Model 6, we can infer that this rebounding effect is due to the influence of 
game-related variables such as relative payoffs, which are discussed in more detail below. 
Of particular importance is the question of whether the treatment has an impact on the game. 
We established in the previous paragraph that the number of sheep declines approximately 
linearly across time; however, there is a noticeable difference occurring after the treatment, as 
the coefficient falls faster than would be linear from about –3.2 in Round 10 to –5.1 in Round 
11. To test whether this difference is statistically significant, we include an impulse dummy 
for this period into the regression of round-played dummies on a linear time trend. The 
coefficient of this treatment impulse dummy is significant at a 1% level and takes on quite 
precisely a value of unity. This implies that the treatment caused a reduction by one in the 
number of sheep chosen. Given that the average number of sheep chosen per round over the 
full game is below five, this treatment effect is not only statistically significant but also 
economically relevant. 
Note that the dummies capturing different types of treatments are neither significant in the 
general Model 5 (Table 3), nor do they survive the testing-down process leading to the more 
parsimonious Model 6. This shows that there is no statistical difference between the three 
possible treatments—penalty, reward, or communication. All treatments have the quantitative 
effect of lowering by one the number of sheep chosen. We suggested above that it may make 
a difference whether or not participants agree to the rule change. The hypothesis was that they 
may be more willing to co-operate if they support the new rules. However, it turns out in 
Models 5 and 6 that it does not matter statistically whether participants have agreed to the 
implemented change in the game rules or not. Thus, players adjust to whatever rule is 
implemented, independent of their own preferences. 
However, the preference for a particular rule may not be due to randomly distributed 
individual-specific factors, but could be related to sociodemographics or game-related 
experiences. To investigate this idea, we explain the choice of treatments in the framework of 
a multinomial logit model. As explanatory variables, we use the regressors from Table 3 in 
addition to the game-related variables (computed over the first 10 rounds): cumulated number   23
of sheep chosen, cumulated payoff, cumulated payoff of the group (excluding the individual), 
and relative payoff. To account for a possible current-period bias, we also include values of 
these variables for Round 10 only. The final model is based on a statistical reduction process 
using likelihood-ratio tests at a 5% level of significance. 
Table 4 summarises the results by reporting marginal effects at the respective means of the 
variables as the actual estimated coefficients in a multinomial model cannot be interpreted 
straightforwardly.
15 The estimated model is statistically significant and the predicted and 
actual frequencies of treatments are similar. 
 
Table 4: Marginal effects for the choice of treatments based on a multinomial logit model 
 Communication  Reward  Penalty 
Occupation      
 Farmer  -0.17**  0.24**  -0.07** 
Religion      
 NGK/VGK  -0.10*  -0.09*  0.18* 






Frequency in % (actual/predicted)  43.2 / 44.2  38.5 / 38.4  18.2 / 17.3 
LR test joint significance   Chi
2(2) =18.02** 
Chi
2(71) = 75.6  LR test exclusion restriction 
Notes: (*), * and ** indicate significance at a 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. For 
coding information on variables, see Table A1 in the Appendix. 
 
None of the game-oriented variables are significant; however, some sociodemographic 
variables help explain the choice of rules. Being a farmer increases the probability of 
choosing reward by 24 percentage points, whereas it decreases the probability of voting in 
favour of communication or penalty by 17 and 7 percentage points, respectively. Becoming a 
member of the Dutch Reformed Church raises the likelihood of preferring a penalty-based 
system by 18 percentage points and decreases preference for communication by 10 percentage 
points and for reward by 9 percentage points. Thus, the choice of treatments is not completely 
dependent upon unobserved individual characteristics. However, it does not relate to 
                                                 
15 For the remaining significant dummy variables, farmer and NGK/VGK, the change from 0 to 1 is given as the 
marginal effect.   24
measurable outcomes of the game up to the period when the choice is made and only very few 
sociodemographic variables are robustly significant. 
Table 4 shows that members of the Dutch Reformed Church appear to view penalties as an 
appropriate method for preventing non-co-operative behaviour. Concentrating the analysis on 
the penalty treatment subsample reveals that Dutch Reformed Church members play more co-
operatively under this rule compared to members of other religious groups. We conjecture 
that this behaviour is related to the Calvinist emphasis on the importance of obeying external 
rules (Frame, 1996). Note that this finding also gives empirical support to Max Weber’s 
argument about the economic success achieved by those societies dominated by Protestant 
ethics (Weber, 1987). 
In contrast, farmers rely on positive incentives to foster co-operation, which also seems 
instructive since the rule was framed as a well-known ‘drought relief programme’. In the 
Namaqualand, subsidies are granted in form of additional fodder, whereas the Namibian 
government offers market incentives of N$15 for each head of small stock that is sold, as well 
as a leased grazing subsidy (Sweet, 1998). Thus, we believe that our chosen framing 
facilitates a transfer of individual real-life experiences to the experimental setting and offers 
important additional insight to laboratory experiments. 
The final group of variables in our panel data model explaining the number of sheep chosen in 
each round relates to game-specific aspects, i.e., we analyse how performance during the 
game influences the players’ choices. While the payoff received by participants in the 
previous round of the game has a positive effect on the number of sheep selected, this effect is 
not statistically significant even at a level of 15%. In the case of an individual’s cumulative 
payoffs, this conclusion holds even more strongly. Thus, the first important conclusion that 
can be drawn from these findings is that there is no statistical evidence that a player’s direct 
winnings influence his or her choices. 
Investigating the estimated coefficients for the group-oriented payoff variables reveals that 
they play a prominent role statistically, as testing all group-oriented payoff variables jointly 
indicates that they are significant at the 1% level. Of the four group-oriented variables that 
remain after the testing-down process, two have negative coefficients and two have a positive 
sign. Looking first at the winnings of the group as a whole (excluding those of person i), we 
find that large gains by the other group members leads players to play more co-operatively. 
The absolute effect is substantial, as the average payment over all groups and rounds is 1230, 
implying a reduction in the number of sheep chosen of almost 2.5. To assess the relative 
importance of the last period’s group winnings, we compute its elasticity evaluated at the   25
means of the respective variables. The reaction is inelastic with a value of –0.49. These results 
suggest that reciprocal behaviour restricts individual incentive to overuse. 
In the case of the group’s cumulative winnings (again without player i), we find a 
significantly positive impact on the number of sheep chosen. The size of this impact is 
noticeable: in the case of the average value of cumulated group payments, the number of 
sheep increases by 3.8. The corresponding elasticity takes on a value of 0.85. 
The second type of group variables concentrates on the relative winnings of person i 
compared to those of the rest of the group, both in the last period and cumulated over the 
game. In the case of the relative payoff in the previous period, the effect is positive and 
economically relevant but not as large in absolute terms as the other group-oriented variables. 
On average, players choose 0.85 sheep more and the corresponding elasticity is 0.18. 
Regarding the cumulated relative payoffs, there is a substantial negative effect that implies a 
reduction by about 3.5 in the number of sheep chosen. The elasticity evaluated at the 
respective means of the variables is –0.73. 
These findings have several implications. First, if the group did well last period, members 
will, on average, reduce the number of sheep chosen in the current period, leading to a 
virtuous circle where people co-operate conditional on others’ co-operation as this will imply 
a high payoff for all group players next period. Second, people are concerned about their 
relative position in the group and play competitively. Third, if the group did well over many 
periods in the past, its members will choose a greater number of sheep. This effect is the 
smallest of the reported group effects and runs counter to the first effect of reciprocity. It 
implies that the virtuous circle of conditional co-operation will begin to weaken after some 
time. Our interpretation is that players will feel less constrained by their social environment: 
since the group is doing fine, the temptation to free-ride becomes greater. Players may fall 
prey to this temptation for two reasons: (1) if everyone else has chosen a small number of 
sheep for quite some time, it is likely they will continue to do so next period and thus 
choosing a large number of sheep next period will generate a high payoff and/or (2) if 
everyone is doing well in the game, one can take steps to improve one’s personal situation 
without feeling particularly bad about doing so. 
A fourth implication of our findings is that the co-operative effect of reciprocity is 
strengthened by inequality aversion. If a player has accumulated relatively more gains than 
the group during the game, he or she will reduce the number of sheep chosen despite the 
temptation to play Nash. If, for some reason, a player did relatively better than the group over 
some time, he or she will either experience social pressure or feel personal restriction and, as   26
a consequence, cut back on the number of sheep chosen. This behaviour fits Bowles’s (2004) 
concept of ‘guilt’: an individual experiences guilt when she deviates from the choices of 
others or from the preference to conform to other players, as argued by Velez et al. (2005). 
We believe that these estimated behavioural effects make sense from a psychological point of 
view and emphasise that it is a combination of factors that shapes behaviour in groups, an 
interaction that has not received sufficient attention in the literature to date. 
 
VII. Conclusion 
The results of this paper contribute to understanding social dilemma situations. First, we find 
that individual income is an important determinant of co-operation in a repeated social 
dilemma game. More precisely, we find that people with more annual income play less co-
operatively. This finding is in agreement with Cardenas (2003), who reports that actual wealth 
negatively affects co-operation. Cardenas claims that wealthy people are less experienced in 
extracting commonly owned resources, as they do not depend on them. We do not discover 
any positive effect of being wealthy or being a farmer and conclude that this type of 
experience does not influence co-operation. Instead, we argue that high income might reveal a 
person’s stronger preference for consumption, risk, or other social traits. 
For example, people with a permanent job—interpreted as an indicator of a high income—
could be more risk loving and thus less averse to the threat of a penalty during Rounds 11–20. 
They might also be more competitive, overconfident, or more averse to feedback from the 
group, especially during the communication treatment. These relations have been explored in 
studies comparing men and women (Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007) in different cultural 
contexts (Gneezy et al., 2008). Lastly, it is possible that people with higher income have 
become more selfish by leaving the collective pressure of the community structure in an 
attempt to escape the increasing poverty prevailing in the rural areas of Southern Africa. 
However, since we cannot control for these or other unobserved characteristics, we must leave 
this question to be answered by future research. 
Our second main result has to do with inherent group dynamic processes that influence 
individual strategies. We show that a combination of reciprocity, inequality aversion, 
temptation to free-ride, and competition affect our participants. Our analysis avoids Wilcox’s 
(2006) critique that dynamic models with experimental data containing lagged dependent 
variables and subjects with heterogeneous idiosyncratic abilities, motivations, or problem-
solving capacities tend to be strongly biased if using random-effects or pooled data. Since we 
expect heterogeneity not to be randomly distributed in the data, we instead specify an   27
unbiased fixed-effects estimator to explain the choices in the game. These effects have been 
previously reported in the literature, but we present them as a set of complementary motives 
that might even work in opposite directions. What specific motive dominates group dynamics 
appears to be influenced more by the composition of the group than by the actual rule chosen 
to solve the dilemma. 
A third result of this study shows that the actual choice of treatment does not matter after 
taking into account group dynamics. In this sense, group interactions are more important than 
exogenously (even if these were endogenously chosen) imposed rules. This finding should 
make us highly cautious about the possibility of deriving general principles of economic co-
operation. On a more practical level, our study shows that the endogenous choice of rules is 
dependent on the socioeconomic background of individuals. Farmers are more likely to 
endorse rules based on rewards for good behaviour, whereas adherents of the Dutch Reformed 
Church prefer a penalty-oriented system. 
Our paper sheds some light on the discrepancy noted in the literature that people seem to care 
about advancing their relative position in real life but tend to reduce inequality in a laboratory 
setting. According to our results, it is true that people with high real-world income tend to 
increase their earnings by co-operating less on average than others. However, in our 
experiment, it is also true that high cumulated earnings activate a person’s inequality aversion, 
leading to more co-operative behaviour, which then reduces the amount of resources 
extracted. In our view, it is likely that the differences in behaviour between people with higher 
income and those with lower income poses a threat to the traditional collective management 
of natural resources. The greater ambition of high-income people to extend their farming 
activities within the collectively managed commons needs to be restrained by formal or 
informal institutional arrangements that support subsistence farming and limit the number of 
animals each individual may own. 
In our analysis, the actual form of this restraint does not matter, i.e., formal institutions, such 
as rewards or punishments, work as well as informal institutions, such as group 
communication. Increasing the land base for emergent farmers will additionally reduce the 
pressure on precious resources as it is more likely that the less co-operative members will be 
the ones who decide to leave the commons. As a result, subsistence farmers will be better able 
to manage the commons. 
   28
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Appendix 
Table A1: Characteristics of participants  
  Mean   Std. Deviation  Min  Max 
Dependent variables         
  Sheep in Round 1  5.65  2.24  1  9 
 Average  sheep  4.84  1.04  1.45  7.40 
Sociodemographics        
Age  38.1 15.5  18 89 
Male 0.55  0.50  0  1 
Married 0.38  0.49  0  1 
Single 0.57  0.49  0  1 
Head of household  0.32   0.47  0  1 
Number of offspring  2  1.97  0  10 
Education 8.72    2.90  0  16 
Years living in village  25.9  16.2  1  67 
No. of church visits per month  1.77  1.26  0  4 
Religion        
 Methodist  0.43  0.49  0  1 
 Lutheran  0.09  0.28  0  1 
 VGK/NGK  0.24  0.42  0  1 
 Roman  Catholic  0.17  0.37  0  1 
 Other/none  0.05  0.23  0  1 
Occupation        
 Unemployed  0.25  0.43  0  1 
 Occasional  worker  0.40  0.49  0  1 
 Pensioner  0.08  0.28  0  1 
 Employed  0.25  0.42  0  1 
Income 11,931    36,744  0  504,000 
Wealth 19,030  43,115  0  315,500 
Committee member  0.30  0.46  0  1 
Collective action  42.5  79.5  .00  365 
Farmer 0.37    0.48  0  1 
Notes: 
i)  Age and education are measured in years. 
ii)  Male, married, single, farmer, household head, occupation, religion, and committee 
membership are categorical variables. 
iii) No. of church visits per month. 
iv) Annual income includes remittances, part-time jobs, and permanent income as stated by 
the interviewee. Wealth includes ownership in land and livestock as well as agricultural 
machinery, real estate, and vehicles. 
v)  Collective action is measured in days of the past 12 months as stated by the interviewee. 
 